The Question of Social Licence and Regulatory Responsibility by Moore, Michal C.
www.policyschool.ca
Volume 8 • Issue 7 
March 2016
SPP Communiqués are brief 
articles that deal with a singular 
public policy issue and are 
intended to provide the reader 
with a focused, concise critical 
analysis of a specific policy issue.
Copyright © 2016 by The School 
of Public Policy.
All rights reserved. No part of this 
publication may be reproduced in 
any manner whatsoever without 
written permission except in the 
case of brief passages quoted in 
critical articles and reviews.
The University of Calgary 
is home to scholars in 16 
faculties (offering more than 
80 academic programs) and 36 
Research Institutes and Centres 
including The School of Public 
Policy. Founded by Jack Mintz, 
President's Fellow, and supported 
by more than 100 academics 
and researchers, the work of The 
School of Public Policy and its 
students contributes to a more 
meaningful and informed public 
debate on fiscal, social, energy, 
environmental and international 
issues to improve Canada’s and 
Alberta’s economic and social 
performance.
THE QUESTION OF SOCIAL LICENCE  
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A summary of discussions regarding the emergence of an alternative  
participation role in regulatory hearings
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The School of Public Policy convened a roundtable with former energy regulators 
to discuss the impact and implications of broader use of the term social licence. 
This report offers a summary of recommendations from that meeting that highlight 
conclusions regarding needed legislative clarity on the relevance and role of the term 
in the future.
Energy in a variety of forms from liquid hydrocarbons to electricity is vital for 
modern society. Useful, affordable and dependable energy in turn, is entirely 
dependent on the technology to convert it's potential and the necessary infrastructure 
for delivery to consumers. Consequently, in developed countries, a working 
relationship and authority will exist between policy-makers and regulators; 
regulators typically approve or deny project permits, establish and enforce rules and 
set standards for the development and operation of these systems.
The public is technically represented in this process by elected policy-makers and 
then in turn by appointed regulators who monitor day-to-day operations in the 
energy sector. Since energy systems are highly technical, the process of hearings, 
evidence submittal and evaluation of performance is usually dominated by testimony 
and submittals that are based on scientific, engineering or economic calculations. 
As a practical matter, however, public interest especially in areas of environmental 
impact or rate changes can be high, even in the absence of technical expertise or 
experience.
Determining how to integrate public involvement in the hearing process as a 
consequence can pose a dilemma for regulators, both in terms of testimony or 
submittals or a perception on the part of the public that regulatory forums are appropriate to 
discuss or even demand changes in policy prescriptions for energy issues.
One consequence of this is a collision of the public's interest and desire to understand or 
be involved in those regulatory processes and hearings normally reserved for applicants 
and experts. An example of the resultant conflict between some members of the public and 
regulators is a tension emanating from insistence that a so-called "social license" be perfected 
before permits or permission are granted. This term of art is not provided for in current law or 
practice. Consequently, it is more a reflection of changeable public opinion than the underlying 
authority, structure and evidence in the regulatory process itself. In short, the term social 
license becomes shorthand for a demand from self-defined interest groups to be consulted and 
granted effective veto power over regulatory approvals or mitigation conditions prior to any 
final project approval.
There is no precedent to guide regulators who are faced with this type of request or 
demand. Ultimately, they must decide how to include or not include testimony, data or other 
submittals as a part of a quasi-judicial hearing or case. The result is a challenge to regulatory 
procedures designed to focus on proposed projects or to interpret the value of any given 
infrastructure project in satisfying future supply and demand needs. Absent new judicial and 
policy prescriptions, the matter can only be incompletely and inconsistently dealt with when 
approached from the regulatory side alone.
1INTRODUCTION
“Social licence” is a phrase appearing with increased frequency in petitions, briefs and 
information concerning energy systems and infrastructure. Given its increased visibility 
and apparent importance in public discourse, the School of Public Policy gathered together 
former regulators and policy experts to discuss the issue of social licence. This document is a 
summary of the discussion and the thoughts that emerged. 
The term “social licence to operate” can be traced back to 1970s’ mining operations, where 
operating projects maintained their ability to operate by co-operating with local communities 
that were affected by their activities. More recently, the Australian Centre for Corporate 
Social Responsibility (ACCSR)1 suggested a broad definition for the term as “the level of 
acceptance or approval continually granted to an organization’s operations or project by local 
community and other stakeholders.” They suggest that social licence has four levels of impact 
and influence: withdrawal, acceptance, approval and psychological identification. They point 
out that most companies or projects are in the acceptance or approval range most of the time, 
a circumstance that can vary over time in response to actions or perceptions of impact by 
developers, the public or concerned stakeholders.
In a recent blog post, Nigel Bankes of the University of Calgary Faculty of Law2 pointed 
out that in general, use of the term “social licence” concerns four issue areas. These include 
the fact that the term itself is normative in the context of operations; that there are differing 
motivations for using the term depending on whether the developer or the opponent side is 
using it; that there is a distinction between a legal licence and the idea of a social licence; and 
the social and financial implications of allowing the social licence to function as a veto.
In the interest of exploring this issue, in June of 2014 the School of Public Policy at the 
University of Calgary invited a small group of people with backgrounds in energy regulation 
and regulatory systems to participate in a roundtable addressing the topic of social licence 
in the regulatory process. This short forum3 acknowledged the role of issues such as those 
cited above, but focused on the much narrower context of energy system operations and 
investment, and more specifically, the impact and influence of the broad use of this term in 
the operations of the regulatory system.
The regulator for energy projects plays a critical role in oversight, control and when 
necessary, expansion, upgrade or improvement to the overall energy system. That this role 
and process are important is true by inspection. Access to a fully functional, cost-effective 
and reliable energy system (this includes electric as well as transportation fuels) is not an 
option in modern society. Stated another way, there are no viable and useful alternatives 
for an inclusive, often redundant and reliable energy system, and the operating process via 
regulatory institutions is critical as well.
1 Leeora Black, Defining the Elusive and Essential Social Licence to Operate, http://accsr.com.au/news/defining-the-elusive-
and-essential-social-licence-to-operate/ 
2 Nigel Bankes, The Social Licence to Operate: Mind the Gap, http://ablawg.ca/2015/06/24/the-social-licence-to-operate-
mind-the-gap/ 
3 
Participants agreed to the Chatham House Rule for attribution; this summary reflects the tone and content, however, of the 
comments and discussion(s) that transpired.
2Regulators and the hearings they conduct represent a critical element of the process that 
assures stability of the energy system. Their responsibilities include permission to locate 
and construct infrastructure, conduct resource assessments and determine rates and tariffs 
for consumers. In the hearing process, regulators apply rules and regulations established 
under their charter and mandate; their decisions are typically only subject to challenge or 
review within the judicial system. A key characteristic of regulatory institutions is that 
they are nominally or legally independent of policy-makers, with terms that either extend 
beyond those in the executive or other policy branch, or in some way are limited in the direct 
influence of those who appoint them.
With this caveat in mind, the focus of this roundtable was to identify the likely impacts 
of various interpretations and use of the term “social licence” on the ongoing and unique 
processes of energy regulatory operations.4
THE “SPECIAL” CIRCUMSTANCES OF ENERGY PROJECTS
Since most energy infrastructure decisions are made following regulatory or other public 
hearings, regulators are faced with responding to calls to somehow address concerns in this 
area. 
Energy infrastructure applications and hearings have become more visibly contentious of 
late,5 in part due to increased awareness of the linkage of energy generation and consumption 
with negative impacts on climate and environmental quality. The question or issue of 
environmental and social justice has entered the ongoing discussion of energy systems 
recently and illustrates a desire not only to bound or limit expansion of energy systems, but 
also to achieve some broader redistributive wealth objectives.
All energy systems, from fuels to consumption, are complex, capital-intensive and alter or 
impact landscapes for long periods of time. Consumers depend on energy to support their 
comfort and commerce, but as a general rule are not involved in decisions regarding the 
types of systems which provide that energy. Connecting the dots among energy development, 
power generation and environmental impacts has been undertaken in regulatory hearings 
with low but specialized audience participation. Recent events suggest this paradigm is 
changing, with increased interest in regulatory processes and outcomes. Along with this trend 
is the call for increased acquiescence to what is termed “social licence.” 
Social licence is not a term used in most regulatory hearings unless cited by advocates of a 
particular position being debated by the regulatory or permitting body. Depending on the 
speaker, the phrase can be interpreted as a proper noun, an illustrative adverb or a political 
compact. The term, however, lacks historical precedent, and typically includes a demand for 
action(s) claimed to be missing from the regulatory process. The roundtable participants 
4 
An obvious alternative category that influences energy regulatory hearings and processes entails the land use decisions 
made by local or regional agencies that may overlap but not substitute for specialized regulatory processes.
5 The contentious nature that we refer to includes disruption of meetings, demands to be included as stakeholders of record 
for a much broader cross-section of the populace, judicial filings, protests and appeals of decisions as well as procedural 
process.
3chose to use the term as one involving the permit or approval process, as opposed to an after-
the-approval maintenance-of-public-trust element commonly referred to as the social licence 
to operate.6
This roundtable allowed participants to address the issue of whether or not the term “social 
licence” implied a compromise of or improved the regulatory process; they also debated 
whether the term served de facto as an indictment of policy-makers who indirectly failed to 
protect the public via the design and authority represented by the hearing process itself.
ROUNDTABLE OBJECTIVES
All invited participants7 shared a common background; they have worked in and around the 
issue(s) of how to manage, oversee, permit and regulate the infrastructure that enables the 
energy system. 
Roundtable participants were asked to discuss the assertion that the current regulatory 
process violates or ignores a critical requirement to obtain social licence from the public prior 
to acting or granting permission for energy system expansion or change. In the context of this 
question, they were asked to discuss the ramifications of such a term being used to challenge 
or redirect current common hearing processes by including a separate consideration of 
demonstrating that social licence had been addressed.
Throughout the discussion, there was broad agreement that the term “social licence” 
has a limited historical context; when known as the social licence to operate, it provided 
a broad and informal charter to project, gain and keep trust support with members of 
the communities affected by a project, process or activity. This in turn provided a broad 
understanding but not a precise definition of the term “social licence.” Ultimately, however, 
this common view of what constitutes social licence differs fundamentally with some interest 
groups’ conception of the process for obtaining a so-called social licence for permits and 
permission for projects prior to regulatory approval. In this preferred system, obtaining social 
licence would be necessary for any project approval, and the claimed zone of impact could be 
expanded to global dimensions. 
Many regulatory institutions operate with the understanding that democratic systems confer 
authority to act on behalf of the public to a regulatory body via the legislative process, the 
police or specific delegations of power. A challenge or, conversely, a re-affirmation of this 
authority is typically outside the scope of regulatory hearings.8
As a consequence, citing a source or basis of authority for a grant of social licence must be 
by definition vague and imprecise; notwithstanding this, stakeholders increasingly suggest or 
6 The concept of SLO is often attributed to James Cooney of Placer Dome Petroleum, who used the term in 1994 in the 
context of risk assessment for mining companies operating in developing countries that operated without the authority of 
rule of law or permits.
7 There are other groups that are intricately involved in the outcome of the regulatory process, including policy-makers, 
project-proximate stakeholders, special-interest groups and the public at large, although none of them specifically has a role 
in regulatory decision-making or managing the hearing process. 
8 Although it restates the obvious, regulators do not create policy, they implement it via decisions, rules and the imposition of 
standards in specialized areas.
4demand recognition of their claims for consideration of social licence in a range of forums. 
This happens often enough that policy-makers and regulators have begun to refer to the term 
as if it had legislative standing, without a clear history or role for including it in proceedings 
or decisions. As a matter of fact, proposals that require permission to locate, operate or 
change landscapes or other environments, need a permit or approval from a regulatory 
body. The public, in this case, is usually represented by a regulatory body. While the public 
associates the authority or often the decision-maker with the legislature, actual rule making, 
standards and decisions originate with the regulator. 
The roundtable participants sided with the view that by definition, the concept of social 
licence is embedded in, and reflects and represents the collective public good. In reality, it is 
effectively granted every time a project is reviewed by and acted upon by the public regulator 
or decision-maker. The new view or alternative premise of social licence suggests the grant of 
authority to regulators is not complete. The advocates of this alternative (or parallel) process 
contend smaller affected groups should be directly involved in decision-making even if they 
don’t qualify as traditional stakeholders. 
A term like social licence embodies an inherent contradiction such as that where a consensus 
might be sought and obtained by a subset of the public, one where they convince the regulator 
that they speak for the public at large, and the regulatory body does not.
Under these circumstances, such a parallel definition or substitute process becomes difficult 
operationally and almost impossible to integrate functionally in the project review process. 
Nonetheless, energy regulators, and to some degree legislators, now face the dilemma of a 
widespread use of a term that lacks a standard or history by which to judge or apply it. 
The regulatory roundtable explored the issue of whether the concept of including a new 
definition of, or including the calculating of, social licence might compromise or interrupt 
the existing regulatory process. The roundtable participants explored several themes, some 
of which emerged organically from the discussion and some of which arose from specific 
questions posed during the roundtable. 
THEMES AND CONCLUSIONS
Energy regulators are critical to the performance and stability of the energy system. In the 
case of regulated utilities, they oversee rates and tariffs and determine the structure and 
needed capacity additions to match load requirements. 
Seven key themes emerged from the roundtable discussions:
1. The term “social licence” is being used more and more frequently by minority or special-
interest groups, purporting to speak for the public, whom they claim are inadequately 
represented by the current process. However, there is no useful or widely accepted 
working definition of the term “social licence”; the term or phrase does not mean the 
same thing as the greater public interest. Representing or protecting the public interest is 
the job for regulators when making their decisions. 
52. This can be a serious issue for regulators, (the risk of so-called tyranny of the minority9), 
a source of disruption for sequential and appropriate public investment and operation 
of critical infrastructure. It is also an opportunity, if it enables the regulator to be as 
inclusive as possible in the regulatory process, especially in terms of getting the “right” 
people (i.e. the 80-per-cent majority willing to compromise and reach consensus) inside 
the consensus tent. Ultimately, it will be a problem if people perceive that it means 
including virtually everybody’s views in a regulatory decision or making everybody 
happy with that decision. The risk is that the 80-per-cent majority who are willing to 
compromise and reach consensus will dwindle, while the marginal or narrow interest 
views will increase.
3. The “community” involved with or concerned with regulatory decisions is, by definition, 
the broader public that typically coincides with the appointing jurisdiction served by the 
regulator or the legislators who appointed them. There is also a more narrow definition; 
that is, those individuals and communities who are most directly and adversely affected 
by the proposed project. 
4. The emergence of the term “social licence” has begun to pose a serious procedural 
and administrative challenge for regulators. Hearings are delayed, decisions are being 
challenged on grounds not anticipated in the regulatory organizational structure, groups 
not represented in the process (i.e. those who don’t speak up) may be increasingly 
disenfranchised and timely investments may be deferred or experience additional costs.  
 
The process is not necessarily destructive, but it has the potential to upset protocols and 
process on critical systems. However, until society gets to a point where there’s a direct 
impact on people, the public will tolerate delays in building projects. The loss or impact 
from this negative process is that part of it will be investment and innovation potentially 
forestalled, delayed or driven to other sectors. 
 
A positive impact of the insistence of various groups to use this term may be revisions 
and updating of regulatory processes, the clarification of definitions of standing and 
stakeholder responsibilities and greater public awareness of the role and importance of the 
regulatory and energy systems.
5. The concept of social licence is likely to be very different for regulators and legislators 
or policy-makers. While the jobs, authority and responsibilities are functionally different, 
these groups also exist in different time relationships or regimes. (Discount rates, decision 
horizons, time focused on single events etc.).
6. Consequently, there is a key need for regulators, in making their decisions, to understand 
and integrate the new world of energy with the old views of how an energy system should 
be configured and operated, especially if the dissatisfaction with the current system 
continues to grow, and potentially thwarts the operation and maintenance of the critical 
infrastructure system. 
 
 
9 Tyranny of the minority, the obverse of tyranny of the majority, is oppression by the minority, perhaps less popular, or 
influential point of view.
6Available approaches include creating novel legislation, forming unusual alliances of 
politicians, non-governmental organizations and other stakeholders, and novel public 
input/consultation approaches that are alternatives to the inherently adversarial regulatory 
hearing. It may also be possible to add a complementary informal process to address the 
issue of social licence prior to planning, resource assessment or formal process.
7. It is critical to insist that the system be transparent, reliable and inclusive, literally 
bounded by the truth. This means as well that the definition of community and affected 
groups must be defined and clearly expressed to the public. Other critical tests of a proper 
and useful regulatory decision include:
• Ultimately, it must withstand court challenge for procedure, evidence and fairness;
• It must be testable and represent a reasonable, clear and fair process without hearsay;
• All the published rules of filing must prevail;
• It must represent independent judgment of the regulators.
CONCLUSIONS
Roundtable participants concluded that this issue is important and worthy of future policy 
and judicial review with clarification by both bodies in order to avoid a breakdown of the 
system that oversees energy systems.
Participants in the roundtable concluded that the most appropriate characterization of social 
licence is as a process rather than a product. This process must reflect rules and standards 
that are unique to the agency in control, while taking into account general issues of health, 
safety and public convenience. Social licence becomes in effect synonymous with the charter 
granted to the regulator to consider all relevant issues (with regard to projects) concerning 
service levels, economic returns and impacts on the community and/or the environment. In 
other words, social licence is included when public officials act with authority derived from a 
constitution or enabling act, and determine the fate of a project, set limitations on its design 
or use, or direct mitigation or compensation for expected harm.
Use of the term “social licence” outside this understanding, however, represents a serious 
commentary on a potential limitation of or compromise of the functional capability of 
regulatory agencies. It implies a new (growing) lack of trust in terms of outcomes or even 
opportunities for public participation in hearings or evidentiary processes; ultimately, it 
challenges the notion of fair distribution of benefits. In some cases, the use of social licence 
as a demand or plea may also act to proxy perceived unequal impacts and assignment of 
costs on individuals or communities. It can reflect a growing frustration10 of those outside 
the decision process (both policy and regulatory) and their ability to de facto alter project 
behaviour or approval process.
10 This is perhaps most clearly associated with the recent Occupy Wall Street protests.
7The result has been a growing phenomenon of intervention and protest by small subsets of 
the overall population who protest projects, decisions, programs and plans that affect them 
directly or indirectly.
The participants concluded this issue is worthy of special concern, given the critical nature 
of energy systems and infrastructure. Broad and potentially inconsistent adoption of norms 
or standards for the inclusion of social licence in the regulatory process poses challenges 
and threats for permits already issued for projects and consistent application of rules and 
procedures for hearings that involve both stakeholders and the general public. It can insert 
an element of uncertainty in the process as well as the outcome(s) in terms of system design, 
cost and reliability; and, ultimately, questions of liability and control of what is effectively a 
common good that society depends on to manage commerce, health and safety, and comfort.
The roundtable participants concluded this was a timely issue that is likely to grow in 
importance and impact, and urged that both the legislative and judicial communities convene 
similar forums in the future to more fully understand and devise systems, policies and 
procedures that take this phenomenon under consideration, and proactively deal with it. This 
step alone will respect much of the public dissatisfaction and mistrust of current process, 
standing and even outcomes.
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